Improving Lebanon’s PSSM Capacity
By Jamie McGhee [ Mines Advisory Group, MAG ]

W

eapons and ammunition management (WAM) is a global issue in which nations are responsible
for the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of weapons and ammunition to help
mitigate weapons diversion and proliferation, and to prevent against an unplanned explosions
at munitions sites (UEMS). Although in most instances preventable, UEMS incidents have increased, leading to significant loss of life, life-changing injuries to innocent civilians, and damage to property.¹
In ideal circumstances countries would have the money for suffi-

and phase out older stockpiles, ammunition is inevitably kept past

cient equipment and storage facilities; however, this is not always the

its original shelf life, with insufficient technical capacity to conduct

case. Often the security sector is left to manage its weapons and ammu-

routine surveillance and maintenance of the ammunition through-

nition stockpiles on an extremely limited budget. This means having

out its lifecycle. Through no fault of the military, ammunition is often

to be self-reliant to keep things running as they should, sourcing basic

housed in less than adequate storage facilities or buildings not origi-

equipment such as wooden pallets to stack ammunition. While this

nally designed for its storage.

is often seen as a short-term scenario, the reality is that these stop-

These are the defining factors in global incidents involving

gaps often turn into a long-term solution or become the “norm” in

ammunition stockpiles, and it’s why the Lebanese Armed Forces

the absence of sufficient cash or capacity to run technical refresher

(LAF) requested assistance to bolster its national capacity for PSSM,

training for military personnel, replace outdated equipment, and keep

as they fully understood the dangers posed to both the military per-

existing storage facilities maintained. As a result, ammunition stock-

sonnel working at these facilities as well as the civilian population

piles can deteriorate rapidly.

living nearby.

The same can be said of the procurement of arms and ammunition. If states do not have a budget to purchase newer ammunition

Global Challenges
There are always challenges when discussing WAM with any gov-

problems are and finding the solutions through dialogue with the

ernment, due the sensitive nature of the subject, and general reluctance

national authorities can bring an easy resolution to what initially

to allow outside parties to see the true extent of the state’s deficiencies

seemed a difficult problem.

regarding PSSM. Every country ultimately has different needs when

Similarly, governments often claim there are insufficient funds to

looking at both technical capacity of existing security sector personnel,

provide better storage, train more personnel, purchase new weap-

weapons/ammunition storage, accounting practices, and management

ons and ammunition, and destroy older stockpiled ammunition.

systems that are at different levels of compliance when looking at the

However, thorough risk assessments of all ammunition stockpiles and

risk reduction process levels (RRPLs) in the International Ammunition

existing storage facilities, and estimated financial implications of a

Technical Guidelines (IATGs).2

potential UEMS can incentivize more governments to better man-

International best practices are often associated with costing mil-

age their weapons and ammunition stockpiles. In the case of stor-

lions of Lebanese pounds (LBP). However, this is not necessarily the

ing explosive munitions, “risk avoidance” is impossible as the state

case, particularly at the start of any WAM pilot project. While it does

already has ownership. Therefore, identifying all risks and ensuring

cost money to train and provide adequate equipment for security sec-

they are professionally managed is critical.

tor personnel to conduct their duties, first understanding what the

The essence of risk management lies in maximizing the areas where we have some control over the
outcome while minimizing the areas where we have absolutely no control over the outcome”.

~ Peter L. Bernstein
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MAG History in Lebanon

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) currently has operations in twenty-six countries globally, and nineteen of those countries have a
WAM program. Operational in Lebanon since 2001, MAG began by conducting mine clearance operations and mine risk education (MRE). Lebanon has endured several decades of both civil and external conflicts that have left the country with an extensive legacy of landmine and cluster munition contamination. In total, MAG Lebanon has cleared more than 18 million sq m of
contaminated land and removed or destroyed more than 62,000 landmines, cluster munitions, and other unexploded ordnance
(UXO). Since 2017, MAG has deployed teams on the Blue Line (the border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel as defined
by the United Nations on 7 June 2000). In this time, MAG has cleared and released an area of more than 400,000 sq m and found
and destroyed more than 29,000 items including anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW). In
October 2018, MAG expanded operations in the northeast of Lebanon and has since conducted non-technical survey (NTS) and
clearance activities; releasing over 786,000 sq m of suspected and contaminated hazardous land.

Weapons and Ammunition Management in Lebanon
In 2017, the LAF approached the U.S. Department of State with a

•

number of trained ammunition technical staff

request to support PSSM activities at three of their existing ammuni-

•

quantity and types/nature of ammunition stored

tion storage facilities. After an initial assessment (21–22 January 2018)

•

secondary hazards or critical infrastructure near storage facili-

of the LAF’s PSSM practices at several locations by a US technical

ties (fuel stations, gas pipelines, underground services, hospi-

team, MAG was asked to assist LAF improve current WAM practices,
•

security of area in which ammunition depot is situated

site assessments (October and December 2018) at the three locations

•

value of ammunition stocks stored

and made recommendations on how to improve the overall security

While this list isn’t exhaustive, it highlights the need to gather sig-

of the facilities.

nificant data to ascertain the appropriate intervention level required to

With an additional $1.6 million in continuation funding in February

ensure the safety and security of both the ammunition stockpiles and

2019, MAG has since conducted PSSM technical site assessments at

the civilian population living near the potential explosion site (PES).11

thirteen locations (three in 2018 and ten in 2020) identified by the

In December 2020, MAG completed construction work at three of

LAF as high priority for possible intervention. At each location, MAG

the thirteen locations previously identified as a priority by the LAF.

assessed and then prioritized storage facilities utilizing a “low cost-

The level of intervention at each of the storage facilities at the locations

high impact” model when looking at WAM interventions, i.e., MAG

varied in scale and complexity, and involved MAG providing technical

provided the correct level of intervention to meet the requirements for

training—an IATG familiarization workshop to introduce the IATGs

that specific location. This process often involves finding a simple, cost-

and international best practices to forty-seven existing LAF ammuni-

effective solution to resolve an issue and mitigate the risks identified,

tion technical personnel from the Ammunition Directorate who will

which is just as effective as a more complex high-cost intervention.

be managing the ammunition at the three locations where these tech-

Whereas all locations are prioritized by risk probability and impact,

nical interventions were conducted. Additional refresher training for

several key factors must be taken into consideration when conducting

LAF personnel was planned in 2020, but due to COVID-19 restrictions

a site assessment to ensure the correct level of intervention is identi-

in Lebanon this was not possible.

fied. These can include the following

Due to land constraints and the encroachment of the civilian popu-

•

accessibility (including visibility) of the site

lation to existing ammunition storage facilities in country, the pro-

•

adequate fire-fighting equipment and personal protective

vision of QD training to the LAF was seen as critical. This training

equipment (PPE)

familiarized staff with online tools that (1) can help determine what

•

adequate lightning protection3

can safely be stored at all ammunition storage facilities in country and

•

compatibility groups of the ammunition4,5

(2) assist them with risk mitigation as part of the long-term planning

•

construction design and blueprint of existing facilities 6

for the Ammunition Directorate.

•

costs of potential rehabilitation/construction works

•

estimated repair costs if UEMS take place (conducted by the

ammunition that cannot be used by the LAF, which will provide much

state)

needed space inside the storage facilities, in turn reducing the risk to

•

future expansion plans of facility (if applicable)

both military and civilian personnel living nearby. A joint assessment

•

hazard class of the ammunition7

of the LAF central demolition site was also conducted on 17 September

•

hazard division of the ammunition

•

location of facility

•

net explosive quantity (NEQ) of ammunition being stored on

•
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tals, ministries, schools, power stations, religious buildings, etc.)

and bring them into line with the IATGs. MAG conducted technical

8,9

As a result of the training, a plan is underway to destroy donor-gifted

2020 to check the location’s suitability for future ammunition destruction operations by LAF explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.
This QD training also allowed the Ammunition Directorate to start

site for calculating quantity distances (QDs)10

planning logistical movements of larger caliber ammunition to more

number of personnel living/working at the base

suitable locations outside of populated areas. The QD training showed
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the LAF the minimum safety distances needed for each site based on

MAG completed the full-scale construction of a new purpose-

the NEQ of explosives being stored. With this knowledge they were able

built ammunition storage area (ASA) in December 2020 that has four

to identify the amount of ammunition that had to be either moved from

explosive storehouses to secure the LAF’s more valuable, larger caliber

the location to somewhere more suitable or marked for destruction if it

munitions at a strategically important location. The facility meets all

was (1) surplus to operational requirements or (2) if there was a lack of

requirements within the IATGs.

sufficient storage space to house it securely and safely.

Image 1 and 2. Storage of projectile propellant before (left) and after (right) intervention by MAG.
All images courtesy of MAG.

Current Challenges in Lebanon
One of the biggest challenges for the LAF is availability of suitable

reduce the risk at these sites, while mitigating the threat posed to the

land for construction of military bases and larger ammunition storage

civilian population. In light of this, the Ammunition Directorate,

facilities. A large proportion of existing military infrastructure was

who are responsible for all in-country ammunition, has managed sig-

purpose built by France in the 1950s. Although a lot of this infrastruc-

nificant logistical movements of ammunition stocks throughout the

ture remains and is still functional, facilities previously isolated with

country to reduce the threat to civilians while still maintaining LAF

excellent safety distances are now located in highly populated areas.

operational effectiveness.

At the end of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), plots of land were

As part of the LAF long-term strategic planning, MAG is in reg-

quickly snapped up by civilians and used to build houses, shops, etc.

ular contact with the LAF’s G3 Director of Planning Department

Building developments continue to expand and now encroach close to

and G4 Logistics regarding available governmental land, and dis-

existing ammunition depots, meaning they are at risk should an UEMS

cussions continue to identify suitable areas pending technical field

take place. As the minimum safety distance in the IATGs for storing

assessments for the construction of large-scale ammunition depots

explosives is 400 m, the LAF has thought innovatively about how to

and sub-unit depots.

LAF Response to the Beirut Port Explosion
On 4 August 2020, a warehouse in the Port of Beirut containing

it eventually led to the collapse of the Lebanese government and

2,750 metric tonnes of ammonium nitrate (confiscated off a cargo ship

resulted in several senior members of the port customs and immigra-

in 2013 for failure to pay port fees and stored with commercial fire-

tion going to jail for their failures leading up to the event.

works and other chemicals) caught fire, causing the ammonium nitrate

While this event was not related to either weapons or ammuni-

to detonate.12 The subsequent explosion caused severe damage to civil-

tion, the devastation the blast caused highlighted the need for the

ian homes, key military and civilian installations, and infrastructure

LAF higher command to seriously look at existing LAF ammunition

in the vicinity of the port.

storage facilities and start working towards removing all ammunition

The incident itself left at least 218 people dead, 7,000 people injured,

stockpiles outside of populated areas.

300,000 displaced, and most of the country’s grain supplies destroyed;

Following the explosion, on 4 August 2020, LAF G4 Logistics

the overall cost of the blast is estimated at $10–15 billion.13 The politi-

requested MAG’s assistance to conduct post-blast assessments of sev-

cal fallout from the explosion was almost immediate, resulting in

eral military facilities near the port that suffered heavy blast damage

widespread rioting and significant increases in major security inci-

and resulted in LAF personnel being killed and injured. MAG, sup-

dents across the country. Through increased pressure by the public,

ported by LAF military engineers, made emergency security repairs at
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these military installations and received additional emergency funds
from the US government to conduct this work.

LAF are the de facto entity when it comes to having the trust of the
civilian population, who look to the LAF to maintain security, conduct

The LAF G4 and the Ammunition Directorate were tasked with

damage assessments of all buildings impacted by the blast, and deliver

moving all unserviceable ammunition identified during the site assess-

food aid packs to all households affected by the blast. Not only did they

ments by MAG and ammunition previously earmarked for destruction

manage the situation, the LAF has accelerated all planned ammunition

by the LAF to various holding locations ready for destruction, pending

destruction operations, and discussions are taking place between LAF

final approval from LAF higher command.

and MAG regarding upgrading the existing central demolition site

The General Commander of the LAF ordered the Ammunition
Directorate to deploy immediately and conduct risk assessments of all

assessed in September 2020 to allow for larger ammunition destruction operations to take place.

military facilities to ensure all known risks were being managed correctly and report back on any new risks identified or non-conformities.

Image 3 and 4. (Left) One of the external roller shutter access doors to the ammunition depot. (Right) A large ammunition
depot in Lebanon constructed by MAG.

Next Steps
MAG Lebanon14 has secured an additional $3.5 million from the

While there is still a long way to go in achieving the required stan-

U.S. Department of State and will assist the LAF with the development

dards, current progress can be attributed to the LAF’s proactive nature

of the strategic plan, which is seen as essential for the LAF to ensure

and transparency at all levels with MAG. The WAM program in

its fit for purpose. Moreover, MAG will continue to foster its relation-

Lebanon has already made significant progress in this regard, and the

ship with the LAF and assist both in the development of its personnel’s

author would like to personally thank the donor and all members of

technical skills and with improving existing standard operating pro-

the LAF with whom MAG is working for, helping these vital PSSM

cedures to ensure compliance with the IATGs.

interventions to take place.

MAG will also provide additional WAM technical training to a
ning (MSP) workshops to higher levels of the Lebanese military to
ensure everyone is aware of their roles and responsibilities regarding
the safety and security of the national ammunition stockpiles and the
citizens of Lebanon. In addition to the capacity development of LAF
personnel, technical field assessments will also be conducted at thirty
locations identified by the LAF. These locations are still being determined as part of the strategic planning discussions.
Technical interventions at six locations previously assessed by MAG
have also been agreed by LAF and approved by the donor. These interventions range in complexity from improving basic security measures
to the complete construction of a new purpose-built ammunition storage facility. When completed, this will be a significant improvement
to both the LAF’s existing technical capacity and overall capability
to securely store their ammunition stockpiles. All planned activities
mentioned will be completed by January 2023.
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